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 Introduction
This project began as a thought experiment. What would a democratic 
agenda setting mechanism for direct democracy look like?  More specifically,
could the ancient Athenian idea of a deliberating microcosm, chosen by 
random sampling, be used to set the agenda for direct democracy in a big 
American state like California? Could it be piloted to reveal the strengths and
challenges that might face an actual institutional design? Could the ideal of 
“deliberative democracy” be made practical? These daunting questions led 
us from theory to practice. We report here on what we learned. 
The past two decades have witnessed a surge of interest in 
“deliberative democracy” in both political theory and empirical work.2 While 
there is now a large literature, we can think of the core idea of deliberative 
democracy as reason-based public will formation. Put more simply, it is that 
the “will of the people” has been arrived at by some process in which people 
weigh competing reasons under good conditions for considering them.3 The 
good conditions may include mutual respect, listening as well as talking, 
access to good information, and opportunity for extended dialogue, among 
other things.4 While the basic idea may seem only common sense, it situates 
itself uneasily within some democratic theory and the most common forms of
democratic practice . 
On the side of theory, Schumpeterian competitive democracy, “the 
competitive struggle for the people’s vote,” does not provide many 
occasions or incentives for mass deliberation. Joseph Schumpeter himself 
treated any reliance on the “will of the people” as chimerical.5 Parties 
compete to win, by whatever means. If they can be more successful by 
manipulating or misleading the public with their campaign tactics, so be it.6
On the side of practice, office holders have little opportunity to 
deliberate, independent of electoral considerations, in the era of the 
“permanent campaign.”  Party discipline further limits their flexibility. At the 
mass level, people have little opportunity or incentive to deliberate policy 
issues in any detail.  These problems do not inhibit Schumpeterian 
competitive democracy but do frustrate aspirations for deliberation.
Direct democratic practices like the initiative and referendum help 
relatively little.  Large sums of money are typically spent for campaign 
advertising, focus group tested messaging and mobilization to support ballot 
propositions.  Effective campaigns often focus on side issues or highly 
misleading or contentious factual claims, or the motives of the donors on one
side or the other.  There are well-meaning public service efforts to inform 
voters (official voter pamphlets, non-partisan voter guides, online voter 
advice applications), but few citizens spend much time consulting them.  
Instead, many citizens rely as best they can on party-based cues and 
endorsements.7  Ballot propositions would seem to be a difficult area where 
high quality citizen deliberation might find a useful entry point.8  
Yet entry points for deliberation may be possible. They need to be 
carefully selected and then piloted to help envisage new institutions.  
Agenda setting for ballot propositions is an especially problematic area of 
current practice, but also, we think ripe for possible deliberative reform. That
is our focus in what follows.  
Agenda Setting and the Initiative Process
Scholars have long noted the extraordinary power over the policy 
agenda that the initiative process grants to proponents, and lamented its 
consequences for the democratic process.  Indeed, the canonical formal 
model of agenda control – Thomas Romer and Howard Rosenthal’s “setter” 
model, which has been applied to a wide range of political institutions – was 
motivated by the example of direct democracy.9 Romer and Rosenthal 
observed how much power was wielded by those who wrote local or state 
referendums, grounding their model in the example of school funding 
measures on Oregon ballots.  They showed that because a proposition’s 
author is able to make a take-it-or-leave it offer to voters, the author can 
force the public to pass measures much closer to its own ideal policy than to 
the preferences of the median voter.  In their review of the literature on the 
initiative process, Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan note that this system 
grants the agenda setter control over precisely what the details of a law will 
be, in a way that is quite different from the normal give-and-take of 
representative democracy.10
This concern over the power wielded by initiative proponents is 
compounded by the process through which they earn agenda control: 
gathering signatures to qualify an initiative, almost always with the help of 
paid signature gatherers.  And because their use is nearly as old as the 
initiative process itself, states have attempted to prohibit the practice of 
paying signature gatherers since 1913-4, when Ohio, South Dakota, and 
Washington first banned it.  Yet the US Supreme Court overturned such bans 
in 1988, creating a system in which agenda power can effectively be 
purchased in initiative contests. 
This has left scholars to lament that: “what was once a valuable 
agenda-setting mechanism for citizens has increasingly become a tool of 
professional special interest groups.”11 Focusing on the primacy of money in 
setting the agenda for direct democracy, Elizabeth Garrett writes that, “The 
link between money and ballot access is stronger than the connection 
between wealth and electoral outcomes in direct democracy. Individuals and 
groups with substantial financial resources can buy their way onto the 
ballot.”12  
The Initiative in California
While the initiative is currently employed in 24 American states, it is an
especially prominent and recurrent aspect of governance in our largest state,
California. California also has more than a century of experience with the 
initiative since it was launched in the Progressive era in 1911, as a way of 
returning democracy to the people and of curbing the influence of big money
and corruption. Billionaires are now notable as individual agenda setters in 
California initiatives. Companies and unions have given comparable amounts
in the past, but recently individual donors have put measures on the ballot 
and financed their campaigns almost single handedly with contributions of 
many millions of dollars.13 Given the prominence of well-financed interest 
groups and of billionaire individual donors funding proposals nearly in their 
entirety, it is hard to conclude that the initiative has either allowed the 
people to effectively set the agenda or has curbed the influence of big 
money in politics.14
A petition with signatures was supposed to empower ordinary citizens 
to set the agenda by determining what the rest of the electorate would vote 
on. Ideally, the signature gathering process would serve an educative 
function as volunteers and civic groups discussed the reasons for proposals 
with petition signers.15 But the task of collecting millions of signatures has 
given effective control of the agenda to those who can pay for the signature 
collection.16 
Within democratic theory agenda setting is a long unresolved problem. 
Robert Dahl for example proposes “final control of the agenda by the demos”
as one of the necessary conditions for democracy (and presumably for direct 
democracy     ). But he is not clear how the demos (the electorate) is 
supposed to exert final control.17 If outsiders determine the agenda then the 
demos has clearly lost final control. But if a self selected subset of the people
takes over and lets the people only decide questions of their choosing then 
the people have also lost control of the agenda18. In theory the petition 
process gives everyone an equal opportunity to propose a topic and get the 
requisite signatures and in that way set an agenda, at least for initiatives. 
But in actual fact, in a large scale state, isolated citizens and even non-profit 
civic groups cannot put something on the agenda without the addition of 
very substantial resources. The equal opportunity is formal and symbolic 
while effective final control is exercised by those who can finance the 
signature gatherers. 
The Deliberating Microcosm 
There is, however, venerable historical precedent for an approach to 
deliberative agenda setting for direct democracy. Use of a randomly selected
microcosm that deliberates on the substance of proposals, goes back to the 
earliest democratic practices in ancient Athens. It is a variation of that idea 
that we explore here in an application to California. It empowers a random 
sample of the people themselves, not their representatives, and it has long 
been used for agenda setting. 
In ancient Athens the randomly selected Council of 500 met for a year and 
set the agenda for proposals to be voted on by citizens in the Assembly. The 
Council was one of several deliberating microcosms that made important 
public decisions—the citizens juries, legislative commissions (called 
nomethetai) and the graphe paranomon (a deliberating group that would 
hear the case that a proposal in the Assembly was illegal). All were similarly 
constituted. All of these institutions added a thoughtful and representative 
element to the work of the Assembly, Athens’s institution of direct 
democracy. 19 The Council did it through agenda setting. The nomethetai and
the graphe paronomon worked after rather than before the votes in the 
Assembly. By the fourth century no proposal passed by the Assembly could 
become law without approval of the nomethetai, the legislative commissions 
chosen by random sampling that would hear the case for and against a 
proposed law and then vote. This institution seems to have been added to 
cure the dangers of orators mobilizing crowds in the Assembly to support 
unwise proposals—a danger which resonates with modern critics of direct 
democracy.  It was a “democratic brake to slow down the machine” and “to 
protect against the possible ill effects of snap votes” in the Assembly.20 The 
graphe paronomon is thought to have provided another incentive for 
deliberation in the Assembly in that if one made what was later thought to be
an irresponsible (“illegal”) proposal one could be prosecuted.21 
Recent times have seen the creation of a variety of deliberative “mini-
publics”—varying in how the participants are selected, the number of 
participants, the data collected on them, the institutional design for 
discussion, the decision rules, whether or not the process is moderated, and 
the product of the discussions (a vote by some decision rule, a consensus, or
individual confidential responses to a questionnaire that are then 
aggregated).22 Citizens juries, citizens assemblies and other mini-publics 
have produced a prominent literature.23 
The clearest example for agenda setting is the Citizens Assemblies in British 
Columbia, Ontario and elsewhere.  These Assemblies, based on a mandate 
from the legislature, were empowered to deliberate about a proposal for 
electoral reform and then to put that proposal on the ballot. While the 
agenda of electoral reform was decided by the legislature and provincial 
government, the specific nature of the proposal was decided by the Citizens 
Assemblies. The method of choosing the members allowed a great deal of 
self-selection, undermining claims of random selection. Although 23,000 
voters were sent letters of invitation, only a very non-random 964 showed up
at the selection meetings, where 158 of them were randomly selected. 
Despite this defect, the Citizens Assemblies’ deliberations were impressive, 
emulating the Athenian Council in having citizens determine the agenda for 
policy making.  The deliberations were lengthy, and the participants clearly 
engaged 24. They broke new ground in the modern era.25  
Other mini-publics evaluate proposals after they go on the ballot. The 
“Citizens Initiative Review” (CIR) in Oregon engages a small sample (of say 
24 voters) in evaluating proposals and making those evaluations available to 
voters before the election.26 This too has sampling issues.  With such small 
samples, sampling error could easily reverse any recommendations.27 In any 
case, our interest here is in entry points further upstream, using a 
deliberative microcosm as an agenda setter. 
Piloting A Design for Deliberative Agenda Setting in California
In June 2011, a statewide sample of registered voters was convened to 
deliberate in depth about the problems facing the state for a project called 
What’s Next California  (WNC). They considered 30 proposals from a broad 
coalition of reform groups, vetted by an extensive advisory group. 
The fundamental idea of the project was to set an agenda for possible 
reforms that could be put before the voters or the legislature. Both decision 
venues were in play because before any civic group undertakes the 
extraordinary effort and expense of taking an issue to the ballot, it is 
reasonable to try and see if the legislature may act on it instead. What 
proposals would the voters of California support (or which would they not 
support) on the basis of actually discussing competing arguments for and 
against those proposals and after getting good information about them? That
was the unprecedented question put before a credible sample of the entire 
state gathered to deliberate for a weekend in 2011.
The key expectations for the project are tied to our aspiration to pilot 
deliberative agenda setting by a representative microcosm of the voters: 
First, that the project would be successful in recruiting a random sample of 
the voters, large enough that its representativeness and changes in opinion 
could be evaluated statistically. Second, that there would be significant 
knowledge gains. Third, that there would be significant changes in support 
for many of the policy options. Fourth that we could identify coherent 
reasons for that support after deliberation.  
The idea is to model reason-based public will formation in setting the 
agenda for new legislation and ballot measures. The representativeness is 
key to answering the hypothetical—what would the people think, under 
transparently good conditions for thinking about these issues? The design of 
the project offers one particular account of what might count as good 
conditions (balanced briefing materials, small group discussions with trained 
moderators, plenary sessions with competing experts). Other mini-public 
designs offer different accounts of the appropriate conditions.28 The project 
aspired to vet proposals, and not to create them from scratch. Our reasoning
is that since potential ballot propositions comprise the agenda, those 
propositions would need proponents. Hence the eventual aspiration is an 
institution that vets proposals from potential proponents and deliberates in a
representative and thoughtful way about them. In some way yet to be 
specified, the proposals with support either go to the ballot or get considered
by the legislature. 
What Happened?
A random sample of registered voters from throughout the state was 
recruited to travel to Torrance for the weekend.29 Out of 527 initial interviews
conducted by telephone polling there were 439 acceptances to attend, with 
412 showing up for the weekend of deliberation, travelling from throughout 
the state. The 412 were compared to a separate sample of 300 registered 
voters who were never invited to Torrance but who took the same 
questionnaire. The 300 in the comparison group were weighted to reflect the
population of registered voters. In both samples there were up to ten call 
backs to reach those initially drawn in the sample. Participants were paid an 
honorarium for the weekend participation plus all travel expenses and hotel 
accommodations.30 
There were no significant differences between the 412 participants and the 
300 in the control group in gender, age, education, employment status, 
ethnicity, political party or political ideology. There were, however, small 
differences in income and religious attendance and some significant 
differences in attitudes toward some specific policy proposals. To ensure that
any differences in specific policy attitudes did not affect our results, we 
conducted a further matching analysis to establish weightings for the 
participant sample and then reanalyzed the changes in attitudes. The results
remained substantially unchanged as detailed in separate analyses 
published online31. Hence, we report the unweighted results for the 
participants here. 
The weekend discussions focused on specific reform proposals in four areas: 
the structure of the legislature, the initiative process, state-local reform and 
taxes. The weekend alternated small group discussions with trained 
moderators and plenary sessions in which questions agreed in the small 
groups were posed to panels of competing experts. The agenda went from 
Friday evening through Sunday afternoon. 
 
To assess knowledge, participants were asked a series of eight knowledge 
questions before and after deliberation. As in other Deliberative Polls, they 
provided evidence of strong knowledge gains.32 Overall correct answers to the 
eight questions increased significantly by 18 points. The specific knowledge 
questions and the knowledge gains are available in Table 1 of the online 
appendix. 
There were thirty specific policy proposals divided into the four topics. They 
are a varied list composed by the advisory group, representing different 
perspectives for possible change in four key policy areas: the initiative 
process, the legislature, state/local relations and taxation (tax and spend) . 
The briefing document included not only a narrative but a separate page for 
each proposal with a clear summary with pros and cons in tabular form. All 
the results for the 30 proposals, before and after deliberation, are shown in 
the online appendix. Twenty-one of the thirty proposals changed 
significantly. In what follows we will identify a couple of proposals of special 
interest in order to illustrate the public’s reasoning. Then we will turn to 
some that were notable for impact, either on legislation or by going to the 
ballot. 
Vetting thirty specific policy proposals is a daunting task for a weekend. The 
briefing document was more than 100 pages in length.  Critics of deliberative
democracy have questioned whether ordinary citizens, even highly educated
ones in advanced  developed countries, are capable of a reason based, 
critically reflective deliberation on complex policy questions.33 If we 
succeeded in recruiting a good sample, it would be no more educated and no
more knowledgeable about politics and policy than the average level of 
ordinary citizens. Could they deliberate on such complex issues? What 
indications can we get from the quantitative and qualitative data available 
that they weighed competing arguments in coming to considered 
judgments?
Inside the Deliberations: A First Look
With thirty widely varying reform proposals, it was not possible to include 
tailor made explanatory variables, close to the substance of the topic of each
particular proposal—except in a few cases. Going into this agenda setting 
exercise, it was also difficult to anticipate which proposals would be of most 
interest, either to the public or to potential proponents of ballot measures. 
So the decision to tailor some explanatory variables for certain proposals 
was a fairly arbitrary one. Nevertheless, it has been revealing. When 
available, they shed light on the reasoning supporting the considered 
judgments post deliberation. 
We are particularly interested in looking at explanatory variables that can be
interpreted as identifying considerations “inside the heads” of the 
participants, rather than merely causal factors that may be more in the 
background. Our interest is in understanding the substance of the 
deliberations and the factors that weigh with the public when they consider 
competing arguments. With this aim in mind, we can look at some proposals 
where we seem to have some relevant explanatory variables with the 
appropriate causal proximity. We can also conjoin quantitative analyses with 
the dialogue we have from the transcriptions of the small group discussions. 
Such excerpts give a sense of the competing arguments the citizens were 
posing to each other to consider. 
To illustrate the process, consider two of the proposals—for lengthening the 
terms in the legislature, and for making the legislature part time with part 
time pay. Either would constitute a big change in the governance of the 
state. 
Support for lengthening terms in the State Legislature from two years to four
years in the Assembly and from four to six years in the State Senate rose 
from 33% on first contact, to 45% on arrival (time 2) to 80% by the end of 
the weekend deliberations. Table 1 shows a linear regression estimated with 
OLS, connecting two empirical premises with opposition or support for this 
proposal both before and after the deliberations.34 An argument against this 
proposal was that “increasing state legislative terms will make them less 
responsive to their districts.” Both before and after deliberation agreement 
with this argument weighs against the proposal for lengthening the 
legislative terms. In both cases the sign is negative and the relation is 
significant. Alternatively, the argument that “increasing state legislative 
terms will let them spend less time campaigning and fund raising and more 
time legislating” weighs in favor of the proposal. Both before and after 
deliberation the sign is positive and the relation is significant.  
The transcripts from the small group discussions give plausibility to this 
picture. Consider these excerpts from various participants in the discussion 
considering this reform:
“I think we need to expect from them that they have a long term-- that they 
don’t get into office, like they do now, with a two year term and the first item
of business is how can I get re-elected?”
“I think it’s really a good idea if they don’t have to run every two years. 
Because every two years they’re out there handing out their hands. You 
have to be influenced by who you get your money from.”
Longer terms might also give legislators the freedom from campaigning that 
might allow them to come to some agreements without immediate reprisals:
“If people aren’t worrying about being re-elected in six months, maybe 
they’ll compromise more and get the budget passed. But it’s like if I cave on 
this, I won’t get elected and people will remember because the election is 
coming up. .. Maybe a longer term will get people more likely to stay at the 
table and compromise and get something done.”
The proposal for a part time legislature with part time pay represented very 
different, more populist sensibilities. It initially polled high. The LA Times 
heralded its own survey at the time of the project: “It is time to bump law-
making down to a part-time profession in California, according to an 
overwhelming number of respondents in a new poll.” The survey found that 
65% favored “moving the state’s full time Legislature to part-time status 
with part-time pay.”35
While there was substantial support in polling at the time, what would the 
people think about the proposal if they really considered its implications? 
WNC only asked this on arrival, after participants had presumably already 
begun deliberating in anticipation of the event and in light of the balanced 
briefing materials which were sent to them to facilitate preparation.36  On 
arrival the proposal had 45% support. However, by the end of the 
deliberations, support had dropped to 27% (the mean response had dropped 
from .505 to .353).37 Do the regressions shed any light on this drop?
Table 2 depicts regressions before and after deliberation for four 
considerations that might weigh in favor or against the proposal for “making 
the state legislature part-time and paying legislators part-time salaries.” An 
argument in favor is that “part-time legislators will represent their districts 
more closely.” Both before and after deliberation this argument has a 
positive sign and the results are significant. A second argument in favor, in 
the current political environment, is that “part-time legislators will be less 
likely to be career politicians.” Again, this argument has a positive sign, both 
before and after deliberation, and the results are significant.
Table 2 also shows results for two arguments against the proposal. “Part-
time legislators will be more open to corruption” has a negative sign, 
weighing against the proposal, both before and after deliberation and the 
results are significant. Also, “part-time legislators will be less informed about 
policy issues” also has a negative sign, both before and after deliberation 
and the results are again significant. 
The transcripts show a mix of considerations on both sides as the 
participants weighed advantages and disadvantages. The argument in favor 
was that they could get closer to their districts if they were part time. 
Perhaps they could use technology and also save money:
“You benefit two ways: one, you’re spending more time at your district and 
you’re actually involved with your area; two, you’re reducing the cost of the 
travel. And that’s a lot of money right there. I mean they have to kinda keep 
up with technology in a sense.”
“when I’m saying part-time is get them out of Sacramento. Let them be 
home. They could do their job on the internet.”
On the other hand with the common perception that the legislature was not 
functioning well and that the state had big problems, there was a greater 
sense that the state might get an even less effective legislature if it was 
part-time:
“I don’t want somebody part-time handling the decisions that’s gonna affect 
my life during the long term. ”
“I feel very uncomfortable with taking work part-time because I feel… how 
much more part-time are they gonna be doing if you gave him that title 
already. Now, they’re gonna be doing even less work.”
Perhaps the drop in support over the course of deliberation for this proposal 
– an idea touted not only in the press but soon promoted by a presidential 
candidate as a solution to the problems of the US Congress and presumably 
other states besides Texas38 –  provides a caution for taking the polling of the
moment as an agenda setter for constitutional change, whether state or 
national. 
The picture that emerges, buttressed by other regressions and transcript 
excerpts in the online report, 39 is the public thoughtfully weighing competing
reasons for each policy option and coming to their individual considered 
judgments. Those judgments, by design, were not collective or shared 
decisions, but as in other Deliberative Polls, collected in confidential 
questionnaires—allowing study of change at the individual level. This 
strategy also protects each deliberator from the social pressure of 
consensus-seeking as in a jury verdict. The process allows us to see what 
individual deliberators really think on reflection. And the collective result is 
what the microcosm really thinks on reflection. In most cases, these 
judgments are significantly different from what they thought before 
deliberation. 
After What’s Next: Initiative Reform
The Deliberative Poll was mounted by a broad coalition of civic groups reflecting 
different perspectives40. Whether or not the results would have any impact on 
any of them was an open question. As it happened there were two notable 
areas of impact. First, when the groups California Common Cause, the 
California Business Roundtable, and California Calls convened a working 
group with an even broader coalition of organizations to consider possible 
initiative reforms, the results of the Deliberative Poll were an ingredient in 
these deliberations. Those results provided cautions on some ideas and 
fueled enthusiasm for others. Cautions focused on the “indirect initiative” 
that would allow the legislature in some way to second guess or revise the 
vote of the public. Four distinct versions of this idea all did poorly, especially 
after deliberation.41 These ideas had been prominently advocated as a 
solution to the problem of potentially irresponsible proposals in the initiative 
process42 but the DP results buttressed conventional polling in showing that 
the public had little appetite for them—even after they discussed them in 
depth. 
The initiative reform efforts culminated in SB1253, a bill introduced by State 
Senate President Pro Tem Darrell Steinberg which has passed the legislature 
and has been signed into law. That bill does not include the indirect initiative
but it does include some other elements which had strong support in the DP 
after deliberation. Of course, many considerations led to the construction of 
the bill, but it is worth noting the strong support expressed in the DP for two 
crucial elements—a system of public review permitting improvement of 
proposals by the proponents and greater transparency of funding for 
initiatives. The DP showed strong support for “creating a formal review 
process to allow an initiative’s proponents to amend an initiative following 
public input.” Support rose significantly with deliberation from 59% to 76% 
(.609 to .692). The bill includes a period of public comment on the internet to
address perceived errors in the drafting or unintended consequences of the 
proposal and the opportunity for the proponents to amend. One of the DP 
proposals was “publishing the top five contributors for and against each 
ballot measure in the ballot pamphlet.” Support for this proposal rose 
significantly from 82% to 91% (.815 to .885).43 The bill directs the Secretary 
of State to list the top 10 contributors for and against, not in the ballot 
pamphlet but on the internet in an accessible format.  This was adopted as a 
more practical method of informing the public with up-to-date information, 
because state ballot pamphlets must be printed long before most 
contributions are made to initiative campaigns.  Given the current difficulty 
of finding this information, this proposal seems to speak to the same concern
as the proposal in the DP.44
The DP can be considered one of many factors that helped set the agenda 
for initiative reform but it is notable that a key approach that the DP results 
discouraged, the so-called indirect initiative, was dropped and some key 
elements that fared well in the deliberations were included. We need 
establish no more than that the results were known and part of the extensive
discussions45 to see the possibilities for the DP as an agenda setter. It is a 
potential test bed for the considered judgments of the public in major 
legislative efforts. While this example is suggestive, it provides a glimpse of 
democratic possibilities.
Proposition 31
The initial idea of What’s Next California was to set an agenda, not only for 
proposals that might be considered by the legislature, but also for proposals 
that could be taken to the voters. Taking this last step posed difficult 
challenges, both because of the cost of signature collection and the 
contentious nature of initiative campaigns in California. The realization of our
initial idea was imperfect. Proposition 31, which made it to the ballot in 
November 2012, included a number of elements that were considered in the 
DP in June 2011. The proponent was the lead sponsor for the DP, the non-
partisan civic organization California Forward. We can identify six elements 
of the DP that were in the proposition. But the proposal was complex and 
included other elements not considered by the public in its deliberations. 
One of those elements, a proposal for so-called “community strategic action 
plans” proved controversial with environmental groups and labor unions and 
led to the proposal being opposed by the Democratic Party. In a heavily 
Democratic state, the proposal was defeated 60.5% to 39.5%.
Nevertheless, to examine the potential role of the DP as an agenda setter for
the initiative, it is worth tracking the support for the six elements that were 
actually in the citizen deliberations, to see how support for those elements 
fared in the election. We do this with follow up surveys.
The six proposals that were part of Proposition 31 are pictured in Table 3. 
They all relate to budgetary transparency and accountability. All have strong 
support both before and after deliberation and they all increase significantly. 
They establish clear goals for government programs with assessments of 
progress toward achieving those goals, two year budgets to facilitate 
planning, three and five year budget projections, transfers from the state to 
local government of control and financing of services with minimum 
standards for delivering them, establishing policy goals for state and local 
government with progress assessed in achieving those goals and PAYGO 
“requiring legislation creating new programs or tax cuts that cost 25 million 
or more to indicate how they will be paid for.”
Proposition 31 was regarded as “very, very complicated”46 a problem made 
worse by rather complex ballot language finalized by the Attorney General’s 
office. While it was endorsed by prominent newspapers such as the San 
Francisco Chronicle and the San Jose Mercury News, the opposition proved 
decisive. The nearly three million dollars required to get on the ballot also 
exhausted the resources available to the public interest coalition so there 
was little if anything left for a campaign. 
The component proposals in Proposition 31 that can be traced back to WNC 
continued to achieve strong support. Table 4 pictures all six components, 
plus an index for the six components (which we have labeled Prop 31 Index) 
and the actual ballot language for the entire Prop 31 (which we have called 
“Prop 31 Ballot”).47 The table begins with T2 (before deliberation) since the 
six elements were not asked at T1 (the initial phone survey) but only on 
arrival at T2. T3 is the conclusion of the Deliberative weekend. T4 is a follow 
up survey with a separate sample of the public in June 2012. T5 was a follow 
up at the time of the election both with our original sample of deliberators 
and a separate post-test only control group. 
For the deliberators, the gains from T2 to T3 were significant for all the 
individual propositions and for the index as a whole. The ballot language was
not yet formulated so there is no measure. T4 is a separate sample of the 
public, not the deliberators and shows that in June before the election, about 
a year after the DP, all the proposals and the index overall had substantial 
support. The actual ballot language also had support but less so in that 
separate sample. 
By the conclusion of the campaign, the deliberators, in a follow up survey at 
election time registered a strong .725 for the Prop 31 index, significantly less
than at T3 but still very high. Crucially, the Prop 31 Index also had a .614 
level of support with the separate control group at T5 (election time). While 
the difference between treatment and control was significant at election 
time, this shows that the propositions generated from the deliberations had a
credible chance of passing muster from the voters who had not deliberated-- 
if they had been put to them clearly and without being packaged with other 
elements. The ambiguous Prop 31 language polled at only .533 with the 
control group indicating more likely trouble for it at the polls at T5. 
Of course the tendency of voters to employ heuristics such as party 
endorsements was undoubtedly an added factor in the actual election, apart 
from the substance. Nevertheless the enduring support for the substance, 
when clearly expressed, signals the possibility of deliberative agenda setting.
It is worth noting that not only was there little in the way of resources for any
campaign in favor of Prop 31, the connection to What’s Next California was 
not part of the campaign. Virtually all voters had no idea that the public’s 
deliberations had helped to generate a proposition. If this origin had been a 
part of the campaign it might have provided an alternative heuristic to assist
with the credibility of the proposal. Voters want to know where a proposition 
comes from. If it comes from the people, that could be a credible electoral 
advantage.  If, in addition, the factors weighing in the deliberations, the 
actual substance of the arguments, had been employed to provide levers of 
responsible advocacy, the campaign might well have done better. 
Conclusion: Toward New Institutions?
Consider the California Deliberative Poll as a pilot for an institution that could
empower the public to help set the agenda for the initiative. How would it 
work?  Several problems have to be solved. It has to be non-partisan and 
scientifically credible yet also connected enough to the political fray that the 
selected proposals have actual proponents to advocate them to the 
electorate at election time. It needs to live up to the same sorts of criteria 
that we have used to evaluate WNC. It needs to be representative of voters 
in both attitudes and demographics. It needs to be large enough in scale that
its claims to representativeness and its results are meaningful statistically. If 
there are briefing materials or sources of information for the deliberations, 
they need to be balanced, and deliberators must be given an appropriate 
opportunity to interact and seek further information. And lastly the proposal 
or proposals selected in the deliberative process have to be followed up with 
something on the ballot appropriately connected to the deliberations and 
advocated at election time. Voters around the state should have an 
opportunity to consider the same reasoning that led the microcosm to 
support the proposal.
To fix ideas, imagine this scenario. A random sample of voters, about the 
size of WNC, is convened every two years to consider possible proposals to 
go on the ballot. Where do these proposals come from? Groups that wish to 
be proponents of initiatives develop proposals and satisfy a low threshold of 
signatures, low enough that civic groups could satisfy them with reasonable 
effort but without necessitating paid signature gathering. The reason for the 
(low, rather than onerous) signature threshold is that there has to be some 
way of distinguishing serious from frivolous proposals. If a proposal is 
selected by the microcosm it then qualifies without the burden of the full 
signature collection. Saving the expense of most of the signature collection 
is an incentive for groups to submit their proposals to this process. A second 
incentive is that they can identify their proposal as endorsed by a 
representative and informed microcosm of the people. Once voters become 
familiar with the process, such an endorsement could be very valuable. We 
know that a prime question voters ask about any initiative is—who supports 
it and why?48 Endorsements are a key heuristic or informational short cut 
influencing support or opposition to ballot propositions.49  In this case, the 
answer is that a proposal got on the ballot partly because a random sample 
of the people thought it was a good idea after they really thought about it in 
depth. As that idea catches on, so that less of the history needs explaining, it
is likely to become more effective and valuable as a property of referendum 
campaigns, increasing the incentives for groups that could act as proponents
to seek the thoughtful and representative endorsement of the people.
We can imagine that the entire process would be supervised by a non-
partisan commission or advisory group. Several key functions would need to 
be fulfilled. The briefing materials for and against each proposal would need 
to be scrutinized for balance and accuracy. Perhaps proponents could 
provide the case for, potential opponents the case against, but all have to 
pass scrutiny from a balanced advisory committee appointed by the 
commission to have final say. Perhaps proponents and opponents would 
each have a right to reply. If there are no opponents then some could be 
appointed to serve that role for this preparatory stage. At the deliberations, 
there would be a list of experts who could respond to questions in the 
plenary sessions and these again would be scrutinized by the advisory 
committee. These are all functions that have been accomplished at past 
Deliberative Polls, even on highly controversial issues.
How could the design ensure a connection between the people’s 
deliberations and what went on the ballot? The people would deliberate in 
choosing between developed proposals. We might imagine a small window 
for the proponents to improve their proposals in light of the deliberations 
with the opportunity for a follow up confirming vote from the microcosm if 
the proposal changed. There are two aims at this stage—identify the 
preferred proposals and get the best version of them in light of the 
deliberations. Obviously, there are many variations and details but this 
scenario sketches an approach that builds directly on the What’s Next 
California pilot.
We can imagine such a process as an alternative route to the ballot, not the 
sole route. The idea would be to provide a supply of at least some public 
interest propositions that the people would find meaningful. If such a design 
proved successful it could be expanded. Perhaps it might begin with the 
selection of one proposal each cycle. Then the number could be increased 
and perhaps more than one microcosm could be convened if the number of 
proposals became large. Given the extraordinary expenditures on 
campaigning for proposals once on the ballot, it seems appropriate to 
imagine relatively modest expenditures for the crucial agenda setting 
process. Like Oregon’s Citizens Initiative Review process, it might even begin
with foundation funding and move to government funding after a track 
record of successful implementation. 
 What’s Next California showed that it is practical to convene a microcosm of 
the state’s voters to consider propositions in a balanced and thoughtful way. 
The microcosm satisfied our expectations: it was representative in attitudes 
and demographics, it gained knowledge, it evaluated a number of proposals, 
produced many significant changes on the basis of identifiable reasons. 
Some of its conclusions even fed into the legislative and the initiative 
process. It showed that a deliberating microcosm could provide a possible 
institutional design for setting the agenda for initiatives. 
The initiative process is supposed to be the people’s process. But the agenda
setting function has been captured by those who can afford it. Why not 
recapture it for the people, using this ancient device? The key would be 
institutionalization and follow up, not only to put the people’s choice before 
the entire electorate but to make the reasoning available as a basis for 
choice. That would add a truly deliberative element to mass direct 
democracy and fulfill many of the initial aspirations of the initiative to 
empower the people to engage in thoughtful self-government. 

Table 1: Regression: Lengthening Assembly Terms
DV: Lengthening Assembly terms from 2
years to 4, and Senate terms from 4 years
to 6
Before
Deliberation
After Deliberation
B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig.
(Constant) .490 .046 .000 .609 .041 .000
Increasing SL terms will make 
them less responsive to their 
districts. (-)
-.43
3
.047 .000 -.314 .041 .000
Increasing SL terms will let 
them spend less time 
fundraising and campaigning 
and more time legislating.
.346 .048 .000 .335 .045 .000
R-square .327 .276
(p) .000 .000
Table 2: Regression: Part-Time Legislature
DV: Making the state legislature part-
time and paying legislators part-time
salaries
Before
Deliberation
After Deliberation
B S.E. Sig. B S.E. Sig.
(Constant) .295 .050 .000 .201 .044 .000
Part-time legislators 
will represent their 
districts more closely.
.538 .047 .000 .556 .043 .000
Part-time legislators 
will be less likely to be
career politicians.
.151 .047 .002 .101 .041 .015
Part-time legislators 
will be more open to 
corruption. (-)
-.134 .050 .007 -.099 .045 .027
Part-time legislators 
will be less informed 
about policy issues. (-)
-.188 .048 .000 -.157 .045 .001
R-square .516 .492
(p) .000 .000
Table 3: Elements of Proposition 31
Six Proposals Before
Delibera
tion
After
Deliber
ation
Change
over
Weekend
s. Establishing clear goals for each 
government program and assessing 
whether progress is being made toward 
these goals at least once every ten years
0.806 0.847 0.040**
t. Requiring the Governor and the 
Legislature to adopt two-year instead of 
one-year budgets
0.617 0.717 0.100**
u. Requiring the Governor and the 
Legislature to publish three and five year 
budget projections prior to the budget vote
each year
0.736 0.777 0.042**
v. Transferring from the state to local 
governments control and financing of 
services provided at the local level and 
requiring minimum standards for delivering
them
0.635 0.697 0.066**
z. Requiring state and local governments to
identify policy goals and publish their 
progress toward meeting them
0.811 0.841 0.028**
ac. Requiring legislation creating new 
programs or tax cuts that cost $25 
million or more to indicate how they will be 
paid for
0.800 0.830 0.029*
Table 4: Support for Proposition 31 Components and Ballot Measure
Proposals T2 T3 T4 T5 T5C T3-T2 p T5-T3 p T5-T2 p T5-
T5C
p
Proposal 1 0.80
6
0.84
2
0.73
1
0.71
1
0.578 0.040 0.001
-0.145
0.00
0 -0.120
0.00
0 0.133
0.00
0
Proposal 2 0.61
7
0.71
1
0.55
7
0.66
4
0.526 0.100 0.000
-0.062
0.00
8 0.029
0.24
1 0.138
0.00
0
Proposal 3 0.73
6
0.77
5
0.71
6
0.74
6
0.642 0.042 0.001
-0.051
0.00
7 -0.003
0.89
0 0.104
0.00
0
Proposal 4 0.63
4
0.70
2
0.57
1
0.66
0
0.581 0.066 0.000
-0.046
0.04
3 0.027
0.23
6 0.079
0.00
2
Proposal 5 0.81
1
0.83
9
0.78
1
0.80
0
0.697 0.028 0.008
-0.047
0.00
3 -0.026
0.10
1 0.103
0.00
0
Proposal 6 0.80
1
0.83
0
0.77
0
0.78
1
0.664 0.029 0.032
-0.065
0.00
3 -0.033
0.14
6 0.117
0.00
0
Prop 31
Index
0.73
4
0.78
2
0.69
0
0.72
5
0.614 0.045 0.000
-0.071
0.00
0 -0.022
0.10
6 0.111
0.00
0
Prop 31
Ballot n/a n/a
0.65
0
0.44
8 0.533 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.085
0.03
1
Note: T2 is before deliberation, upon arrival of Deliberative Poll; T3 is after deliberation, upon departure; 
T4 is a survey that used the same questions as the other survey time points, but the sample is 
independent of the other time points. It is a survey of the public and not the deliberators.  T5 is a follow-up
survey for Deliberative Polling participants; T5C is a survey conducted at the same time as T5 with an 
independent sample of the public, a control group.  Prop 31 Index is a survey question that combines all of 
the individual Proposals 1-6, using the language that appeared on the Deliberative Poll.  Prop Ballot 31 is a 
survey question that covers the same substance, but uses the language of the actual ballot proposition 
summary that appeared on the June 2012 ballot in California.
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